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Promoting Research and Development (R&D) and innovative activity is a key 
element of the EU Lisbon Agenda and is seen as playing a central part in stimulating 
economic development. In this paper we argue that, even allowing for benevolent 
policymakers, informational asymmetries can lead to a misallocation of public 
support for R&D, hence government policy failure, with the potential to exacerbate 
pre-existing market failures. Initially, we explore alternative allocation mechanisms 
for public support, which can help to minimize the scale of these government policy 
failures. Of these mechanisms (grants, tax credits, or allocation rules based on past 
performance), our results suggest that none is universally most efficient. Rather, the 
effectiveness of each allocation rule depends on the severity of financial constraints 
and on the level of innovative capabilities of the firms themselves. 
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Promoting Research and Development (R&D) and innovative activity is seen as 
playing a central part in stimulating economic development (Fagerberg et al. 2006; 
Ramstad 2009; Becker and Pain 2008; Edquist 2011; Innovation Union 2011). 
Despite persistent skepticism about technology policy in certain academic and 
political circles, investment in R&D is a major issue for Europe’s long-term policy 
strategy (Ortega-Argiles et al. 2009). Moreover, considerable evidence shows that 
there is a positive link between government policy incentives for R&D and the extent 
of firms’ R&D investments: the additionality of public R&D support is often, though 
not always, positive (Meuleman and De Maeseneire 2012; Zúñiga-Vicente et al. 2013; 
Luukkonen 2000).  
In the economic environment currently prevailing in most economies as a result of the 
financial crisis, many commentators are hailing the benefits of promoting R&D and 
innovation activity as a means to help economies to break the dire economic cycles 
and poor growth prospects faced by many (Wyckoff 2009; Bailey et al., 2011). Recent 
evidence also shows that access to public funding for innovation ‘helps to counteract 
pro-cyclical trends in innovation investments’ (Paunov 2011, p. 32).  
Given this backdrop, many governments are investing sizably in R&D policy 
interventions and instruments such as R&D grants (Innovation Union 2011). In light 
of increasing government budget constraints, it is more important than ever that a 
sufficient rationale exists for government interventio  with respect to such R&D 
policy interventions (with respect to market failure and recent evolutionary 
perspectives). It is equally important, as suggested in the current paper, to study issues 
of government policy failure (i.e. potential allocative failures resulting from the 
government’s action) with respect to R&D supports, an area of public policy where 
this argument is easily invoked but seldom analyzed by both academic and 
policymaking commentators to date. The current paper ims to begin to fill this gap in 
the literature, by incorporating government failure (and the deriving loss of social 
welfare) in a number of theoretical illustrations rep esenting typical situations in R&D 
policymaking. 
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Even assuming a benevolent policymaker who only pursues public interest, 
informational asymmetries and incomplete information can obviously lead to 
misallocation of public support for R&D, hence government policy failure, with the 
potential to exacerbate pre-existing market failures. Allowing for the presence of this 
failure, we compare the social costs and benefits o alternative policy instruments 
(e.g. grant subsidies and tax credits) and alternative subsidy allocation mechanisms 
(e.g. random, grandfathering principle), and analyze the situation where firms have 
different financial constraints or innovative capabilities. 
Each of these situations has been already analyzed in the literature. Our original 
contribution is to review them by adopting and adding a government policy failure 
perspective. Thus, the current paper is a step in the direction of deepening the 
understanding of subsidy allocation processes, as invoked, for instance, in Blanes and 
Busom (2004) and in Takalo and Tanayama (2010).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss the 
rationale for government intervention in the market for R&D, focusing on related 
market failures and on the concept of government policy failure. In the second section 
we bring the concept above in the context of a two-firm case, where both firms suffer 
from financial constraints but demonstrate differing abilities to produce technological 
spillovers to the benefit of society. By contrast, fourth section  assumes that both 
firms are financially unconstrained. The fifth section considers the allocation of 
subsidies between firms with different costs of capital and innovative capabilities. In 
the sixth section we examine the policy insights stemming from the theoretical 
analysis, and conclusions end the paper. Throughout, we illustrate the effectiveness of 
various allocation mechanisms, which have been adopte  in the past or which are 
suggested by other policy arenas. 
Market and Government Failures 
In general terms, market failure arises from failures in the areas of competition, 
presence of public goods, positive or negative externalities, incomplete markets, 
information failures or market disequilibrium (Glykou and Pitelis 2011; Stiglitz 
2000). In terms of R&D and innovation, the main justification for public intervention 
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resides in the lack of incentives for private agents to invest, as well as in their lack of 
means (Martin and Scott 2000). 
The first problem, lack of incentives, can result from positive externalities of 
technological development activity and from the public-good characteristics of newly 
generated knowledge, both of which raise questions about the potential 
appropriability of private R&D efforts. As R&D is likely to generate spillovers, and 
might achieve results possessing public good characteristics, agents are not 
incentivized to perform as much R&D activity as would be socially optimal and 
desirable (Arrow 1962; Jones and Williams 1998).1 These issues are likely to provide 
the greatest disincentives when technologies are of a general-purpose nature 
(Bresnahan and Trajtenberg 1995)2.  
The second problem, lack of means to invest, may arise due to information 
asymmetries in capital markets, exacerbated by the fact that R&D activity is typically 
human-capital-intensive, opaque and risky. As argued by Giordani and Zamparelli 
(2011), R&D investment decisions are made while investors are faced with conditions 
of ‘severe uncertainty’. On the one hand, potential financiers have less information 
than entrepreneurs about the intrinsic riskiness of, and expected returns from, a given 
R&D project. This asymmetry may lead to insufficient provision of capital and loans 
(if any at all) necessary to get a project started (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). On the other 
hand, after the project’s inception, an agency problem may arise as the financier is 
unable to control the entrepreneur’s behavior nor ensure that the latter does not 
behave opportunistically.  
                                               
1. Roper et al. (2004) provide an overview of the different mechanisms through which positive 
externalities of R&D can occur, while Borrus and Stowsky (1997) provide estimates of private and 
social returns from R&D activity. Specifically, Borrus and Stowsky (1997) estimate the private rates of 
return on investments in new technology to be betwen 20 to 30 percent in a variety of industries with 
social returns varying from 20 to 100 percent with an average of 50 percent (see also Mansfield et al. 
1977).  
2. The Arrowian argument has been criticized in light of a number of subsequent theoretical 
developments. A major point has been raised by industrial organisation scholars, who have shown that 
competition between firms may result in a duplication of R&D efforts and, therefore, in a total 
investment level which is above the socially optimal level (Fundenberg and Tirole 1987; Dasgupta 
1988; D’Aspremont and Jaquemin 1988). This non-optimality happens in a patent race, where two 
firms struggle to be the first to obtain a monopoly: only the winner will see its R&D investment 
rewarded by the patent, while the investment carried out by the loser cannot be recovered and 
represents a cost for society. 
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In light of the above, the entrepreneur’s inability to finance the R&D project with 
his/her own funds may be (mis)taken by the financier as evidence of the 
entrepreneur’s low motivation and effort. Similarly, it may be seen as a sign of the 
entrepreneur’s lack of confidence in the success of the project, resulting in insufficient 
external provision of resources (Holmström and Tirole 1997). Although information 
asymmetries can interfere with the good functioning of any capital market, they affect 
young and small enterprises particularly severely, as these enterprises (relative to their 
larger and older firm counterparts) lack track recods, collaterals and reputation 
(Zúñiga-Vicente et al. 2013; Czarnitzki and Kraft 2006). Additionally, from the 
financier’s viewpoint, the volume of finance required may not be worth undertaking a 
costly risk-assessment procedure (Peneder 2008).  
Despite the importance of justifications for intervntion in R&D markets linked to 
more strategic objectives (Metcalfe 1997), policy interventions are usually initiated to 
overcome or mitigate the negative effects of the above market failures. These policy 
interventions include direct funding, fiscal incentives, and capital market stimulation. 
The public agent changes the relative cost of innovati n to favor promising projects or 
desirable technologies, either by reducing the margin l cost of capital or by raising the 
marginal rate of return on private R&D investment (Wu 2008; Hall and van Reenen 
2000). The public agent’s goal is to induce firms to invest more than they would have 
in the absence government support, and also to bridge the financing gap that concerns 
specific types of private agents; for example, young a d small enterprises whose lack 
of finance can curtail – or indeed prevent – investment (Peneder 2008). 
However, a number of potential failures in governmet action can inhibit the 
achievement of many of the above goals. This is the notion of government policy 
failure. Weimer and Vining (2005) distinguish ‘passive government failure’ (where 
government does not intervene to correct market failures so as to achieve Pareto-
superior outcomes) from ‘active government failure’ (where government intervention 
leads to less efficient allocations than those that existed prior to the intervention). We 
may also think of real-world situations where failure is partial, due to the fact that 
government intervention improves the allocation but in an incomplete way. 
In the current paper, we focus on active government policy failure. Some authors 
convey a pessimistic vision of such failure: for example, Kreuger (1990) argues that 
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‘economists have demonstrated an incredible naivete wi h regard to government 
behaviour [...]’ (p. 21-22); similarly, Winston (2006, p. 3) argues that evidence over 
the past thirty years ‘suggest[s] that welfare cost f government failure may be 
considerably greater than that of market failure’; while Nedergaard (2006, p. 398) 
warns that if market failures at the micro level are ddressed by public intervention, it 
may encourage private economic agents to ‘become pot ntial rent-seekers in the 
political system and create government failure […] resulting in further increase in 
market failures’. 
As suggested by public choice theory, active failure may be caused by government 
officials who are not benevolent and behave in a self-int rested way, as highlighted in 
the budget-maximizing model (Niskanen 1971) and thebureau-shaping model 
(Dunleavv 1991). More generally, however, government choices may be limited by 
political values, norms or processes that force government to reconcile choices among 
conflicting preferences (Dolfsma 2011). Values or nms such as ‘fairness’ or ‘equity’ 
may constrain governments’ options; political processes may empower distortive, 
rent-seeking behaviors, resulting in the phenomena of corruption and capture (Aidt 
2003; Winston 2006). However, Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) have suggested that 
there may be a trade-off between market and governmnt failures; government 
intervention might somehow be “optimal” if market failure is relatively important and 
government failure (e.g. corruption) relatively rare. 
On the other hand, even if policymakers are benevolent, government policy failure 
may arise due to lack of sufficient information to make the right decisions, which can 
hamper any serious industrial or R&D policy targeting. Pack and Saggi (2006) list 
many issues regarding which policymakers must be knowledgeable in order to 
implement successful industrial policies; these issue  relate to knowledge spillovers, 
learning, and the nature and extent of capital market spillovers. As policymakers are 
not omniscient, one could consider industrial and R&D policy to be overambitious. 
On the other hand, information constraints affect entrepreneurs as well as 
policymakers; in addition justifications for intervntion are not clear-cut even in 
conventional areas of economic policy (Rodrik 2008). Starting from this viewpoint, 
Rodrik challenges the idea of industrial policy aimed at correcting distortions by 
means of first-best instruments. He puts forward a vision of industrial policy as a 
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process of discovery, where the policymaker elicits information from the private 
sector and both engage in a process of strategic collaboration and coordination ‘[…] 
with the aim of uncovering where the most significant bottlenecks are, designing the 
most effective interventions, periodically evaluating the outcomes, and learning from 
the mistakes being made in the process’ (Rodrik 2008, p. 20). During this process, 
government must deal with limited information and control over private market 
responses to the public stimulus, and with the choice f intervention and allocation 
mechanisms. 
As to private responses to R&D policy, recent developments in program evaluation 
literature are providing us with new insights. The majority of studies point to the 
positive impact associated with R&D incentives (Toivanen 2006; Zúñiga-Vicente et 
al. 2013); however, findings in general are still rather mixed (García-Quevedo 2004), 
a key issue being what effects should be expected. According to traditional economic 
theory, effects may be expressed in terms of the additional inputs or outputs of a 
‘black-box’ innovation process (David et al. 2000; Klette et al. 2000); see Cerulli 
(2010) for a recent review of the related applied econometric literature. According to 
more evolutionary, systemic and managerial views, additional effects should be 
sought in the form of ‘softer’ elements, such as learning or organizational behavior 
within the firm which raise the firm’s innovation capability (e.g. Buisseret et al. 1995; 
Fier et al. 2006; Busom and Fernandez-Ribas 2008; Autio et al. 2008; Clarysse et al. 
2009; Caloffi and Mariani 2011; Berggren and Elinder 2012). Beyond equilibria at the 
single-firm level, much work must be done to understand the positive or negative 
effects of R&D programs in terms of broader general quilibrium (Klette et al. 2000; 
Lenihan 2011). With respect to control of private responses, governments have some 
opportunities to monitor the behavior of beneficiary fi ms during the process of policy 
implementation. 
In addition, and perhaps more importantly, effort should be focused on designing 
programs where incentives to private R&D are delivered in an appropriate form, and 
are allocated according to the ‘right’ mechanisms. The issue of how to allocate R&D 
incentives is underexplored in the literature (Fu et al. 2012). In practice, governments 
can adopt a wide range of indirect and direct support measures for R&D (see e.g. 
Griffith 2000; David et al. 2000). Intellectual proerty rights legislation is the most 
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obvious example of an indirect policy; direct policies include direct funding for R&D 
(i.e. grants/subsidies), government R&D contracts, tax credits for R&D and, under 
particular circumstances, investment in human capital formation.  
Here, our focus is on direct measures; of these, the most commonly used in OECD 
countries are R&D loans or grants (Blanes and Busom 2004), which are expected to 
be effective particularly where potential for knowledge spillovers is significant (e.g. 
Spence 1984; Trajtenberg 2001). However, this type of policy instrument raises 
significant operational issues related to the size of the grant. Toivanen (2006, p. 74) 
notes that, ‘An important insight derived from the simplest model of R&D subsidies is 
that optimal subsidies are heterogeneous, i.e., they ought to vary from firm to firm and 
from project to project, and that the informational demands for designing optimal 
policies are potentially prohibitive.’ Pack and Saggi (2006) emphasize a similar point: 
given full information, optimal subsidies would have to be non-uniform.  
In practice, however, if subsidies are treated as uniform, a range of policies can be 
used. Subsidies could be treated as uniform across fi m , with each firm receiving the 
same absolute value of subsidy if it meets certain eligibility criteria. This type of 
approach is exemplified by innovation voucher measures, which are directed at easing 
small firms’ access to external knowledge in order to carry on or develop/expand their 
R&D and innovation processes (Cornet et al. 2006; DG ENTR-Unit D2 2009).  
Other alternatives relate to providing uniform unit-subsidies for R&D, based either on 
the grandfathering principle – i.e., firms receive incentives based on pre-subsidy R&D 
levels (e.g., tax credits) – or on a simple per-unit basis where the level of subsidy is 
proportional to proposed expenditure on R&D (e.g., R&D grants). This latter option is 
by far the most commonly employed in European countries, and may respond to more 
or less selective procedures based on policymakers’ assessment of the quality and 
potential of R&D projects (Takalo et al. 2013; Huergo and Trenado 2010). R&D 
grants have the advantage of directly tackling market failures that prevent firms from 
performing R&D, but also leave room for moral hazard on the part of the firm. 
Additionally, they may give rise to arbitrary decisions by government and possible 
government policy failures. A tax credit system for R&D is preferred by some authors 
and policymakers; because it requires no discretion and (ex-ante) involvement by 
government or bureaucracy, it can benefit all businesses that have incurred eligible 
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R&D expenditures (Griffith 2000). Although tax credits may provide a stimulus to 
overall R&D activity, some authors have stressed that ey are less suitable than 
grants to address the sources of market failure (e.g. lack of capital to be invested, 
Czarntzki et al. 2011); in addition, they are likely to encourage firms to undertake 
R&D activities resulting in short-term revenues, rather than projects with high rates of 
social return or long-term exploratory activities (Hall and van Reenen 2000).  
Finally, distribution mechanisms, including auction-based allocation mechanisms and 
random allocation of R&D support, are less politically cceptable and are difficult to 
implement. The auction approach has been developed by Giebe et al. (2006), among 
others; due to its peculiarities and complexity, space constraints prevent its analysis in 
the current paper. 
Given our concern with government policy failure, we define it more explicitly by 
employing a partial equilibrium framework. Subsequently, we consider alternative 
assumptions about firms’ financial constraints, costs of capital and innovative 
capabilities. Throughout, we discuss alternative alloc tion mechanisms for public 
support that can help minimize the scale of governmt policy failures. 
Defining Government Policy Failure with Financially Constrained Firms 
As do Howe and McFetridge (1976) and David et al. (2000), we posit that at each 
planning period firm i faces a large set of potential R&D investments, each of which 
has expected costs and benefits. Therefore, the proj cts may be compared and ranked 
in descending order on the basis of their internal ate of return. This ranking explains 
why the firm’s marginal private returns (MPR) decreas s as the firm increases its 
R&D investments.  
The firm also faces marginal private costs (MPC) that varies with size of investment 
and reflects the opportunity cost of investing in R&D. Following Hall (2002) and 
Hottenrott and Peters (2012), we assume that the firm draws on internal funds (IF) 
before resorting to external funding3; the cost of external capital is assumed to be 
higher than that of internal funds, as lenders requi  a risk premium in imperfect 
capital markets. Hence, the MPC schedule is first horizontal (at level cint) and then 
                                               
3. This assumption is consistent with pecking-order theory in corporate finance (Myers and Majluf 
1984).  
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upward sloping (see Figure 1).4 For profit-maximizing firm i, the optimal level of 
R&D investment *iI  occurs where marginal private return (MPR) equals marginal 
private cost (MPC). 
Figure 1 


























Suppose that the government considers subsidizing R&D activity in two financially 
constrained5 firms, A and B. While the economy contains many of these firms, the 
government considers subsidizing only two of them.6 As illustrated in Figure 1, it is 
assumed that R&D investments of firm A generate additional social returns in the 
form of knowledge spillovers or externalities. Thus its marginal social return (MSRA) 
schedule lies above its marginal private return (MPR) schedule. Here, subscript 
indicates the firm; however, no subscript is used if a schedule or figure is the same for 
both firms. Here we assume that R&D investments undertaken by firm B generate no 
social benefits. In this case, the MSRB and MPR schedules coincide. Apart from the 
difference in the marginal social returns, the firms are assumed to be identical. Both 
firms’ private optima are given by point a, with the level of R&D being undertaken 
given by *I . 
                                               
4. In the literature, these schedules are also called the marginal rate of return (MRR) and the marginal 
rate of cost (MRC) when no distinction is made between private and public returns (and costs). 
5. By financial constraints we mean that in order to reach the private optimum, a firm will have to 
resort to external sources of funding. 
6. We also assume for simplicity that subsidization of firm A does not affect the optimal investment of 
firm B (i.e., no displacement effect). 
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We can usefully distinguish two policy scenarios here. First, assume that the 
government is perfectly aware of the scale of social benefits arising from each firm’s 
R&D activity. As R&D undertaken by firm B generates no social benefits (MPR = 
MSRB), government does not wish to subsidize its R&D investments. On the contrary, 
firm A’s R&D investment ∗I  is below the socially optimal level: at the private 
optimum, the marginal social return is higher than the marginal cost. This is a classic 
illustration of market failure in the case of positive externalities (Nelson 1959; Arrow 
1962). 
With perfect information, the government can reduce the social welfare loss by giving 
a cash subsidy (grantA) to firm A. It is assumed that this amount of the grant is equal 
to the social benefit; thus it maximizes social welfare.7 The grant subsidy shifts its 
MPC curve right to ACMP ′ . At the new private optimum a′ , firm A has increased its 
R&D investments to AI′ , social benefits have increased by quadrangular abab ′′ , and 
market failure has been removed. Note, however, that reduction of market failure did 
not come without a price. The social (opportunity) costs of the grant are given by 
rectangle SC (grey area). That is, a (safe) return (cint) for public subsidies could have 
been alternatively received from financial markets.8 
Second, assume that the government’s information set is less than perfect. This 
situation may arise when social benefits cannot be o served by all actors or are 
difficult to determine or estimate in advance. Information can also be asymmetric. 
Even if the firm knows the pattern of social benefits, it may choose not to reveal it; for 
instance, in an attempt to limit the outflow of spillovers (this could be the case for 
firm A which produces spillovers) or to ensure that it is not excluded by the set of 
beneficiary firms (this could be the case for firm B). In either situation, given a budget 
for supporting R&D, the government faces an allocati n decision in the context of 
incomplete information. 
                                               
7. Note that the grant is independent of the firm’s R&D expenditures. Later we will consider cases 
where the subsidy is proportional to the firm’s R&D expenditures. 
8. If we define by ∆Ii the increase in the R&D investment for firm i directly covered by the grant 
subsidy (i.e. Ii – I’ i), then it is possible to identify a situation of additionality (or neutrality) if ∆Ii > 
subsidy (= ∆I i) or a situation of crowding out if ∆Ii < subsidy. In Figure 1 the use of the grant subsidy 
on firm A results in partial crowding out. 
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Suppose that the government is aware of the distribution of social benefits arising 
from R&D undertaken by firms A and B, but does not know which of the firms’ R&D 
creates positive social benefits. In light of this incomplete information, the 
government opts for a uniform (i.e. homogenous) R&D grant subsidy (½grant for 
both)9, as depicted in Figure 2. In this instance, A and B will settle at b ′′ , both 
undertaking R&D investment of I ′′ . In the scenario depicted, a grant subsidy for firm 
A’s R&D investment will generate additional social benefits ( abab ′′′′ ), while a 
subsidy for firm B’s R&D investment will be completely wasteful. The cost of the 
grant subsidies is two rectangles ½SC. 
Figure 2 


























Government policy failure is defined as the loss of ocial welfare due to government’s 
inefficient subsidy allocation. In the above example, government policy failure (GPF), 
resulting from incomplete information, can be calculated as a difference in the 
(increase in) social benefits between the two cases: 
   ( ) [ ] abab½abababab½SC)(0½SC)ab(abSCababGPF ′′=′′′′−′′=−+−′′′′−−′′=  (1) 
                                               
9. In practice such a government subsidy can be awarded as a voucher (providing a subsidy of equal 
value to each firm). This approach minimises transaction costs on the part of both government and 
firms, and may have the political advantage of ‘fairness’. In the case of the Dutch innovation voucher 
scheme which adopts this approach, both of these advantages have been important to the scheme’s 
take-up and success (Cornet et al. 2007; Cornet et al. 2006). This voucher-type government subsidy is 
now available in most European regions (DG ENTR-Unit D2 2009; Danish Innovation Policy 2010; 
Technopolis 2010). 
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In this example, half of the social benefit is lost due to the failure of government to 
allocate subsidies correctly. The same result may be achieved if we assume that the 
grant subsidy G is randomly assigned to firm A or to firm B, if both firms suffer from 
financing constraints and only firm A is able to produce positive social returns. We 
denote by 1GA =  the situation in which firm A is randomly assigned the grant, which 
occurs with probability ½)1G(P A == . Similarly, the situation in which the grant is 
randomly assigned to firm B (i.e., 1=BG ) will occur with probability 










    (2) 
This first example illustrates that government policy failure arises in any situation 
where subsidies are misaligned with the social benefits of firms’ R&D activity. 
However, for simplicity, we have assumed that government’s subsidy budget is 
sufficiently large to reach the social optimum. In a situation where government’s 
subsidy budget is less than that, some market failure will remain. To minimize this 
market failure, a government with perfect information would allocate all of the 
subsidy to firm A (cf. Figure 1). With incomplete information, allocation of the 
subsidy across both firms would result in a further loss of social welfare as illustrated 
in Figure 2.  
Government Policy Failure with Financially Unconstrained Firms 
In the previous section, we assumed that firms are financially constrained. That is, 
they do not have sufficient internal funding for optimal R&D investment and 
therefore must resort to external funding. Suppose in tead that firms are financially 
unconstrained at their initial private optimum (Figure 3). As before, firm A generates 
positive social returns but firm B does not. Assume that government tries to increase 
firm A’s investments in R&D, but falsely assumes that it is financially constrained. 
Figure 3 shows that the additional cash due to the grant subsidy does not change the 
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optimal R&D investment ∗I  for an unconstrained firm; therefore, the full amount of 
the grant is wasted, regardless of its amount and to which firm it is given. 
Figure 3 























We now address the question of whether some other allocation mechanism could be 
used to increase (financially unconstrained) firm A’s investment in R&D and thus 
possibly lower the government policy failure. We begin by assuming that firm A is 
subsidized proportionally to its current expenditure on R&D, for example, using a tax 
credit system.10 As illustrated in Figure 4, it is then possible to find a level of tax 
credit that would increase firm A’s R&D investment to AI′ . The social benefits would 
increase by quadrangular abab ′′ , but at a high social cost relative to the benefits (see 
grey area SC). Marginal social returns should be greater (e.g. MSRC curve) if the 
illustrated tax credit is to meet the cost-benefit analysis criteria (e.g. acac ′′ ). If social 
benefits increase by less than the tax credit system costs, there is a clear failure in 
government action. As in the previous section, government policy failure can also 
arise if government does not know which of the two firms generates positive social 
benefits, or if it sets an incorrect magnitude for the tax credit. 
                                               
10. See Appendix for an example that compares grant subsidy allocation to tax credit allocation when a 
firm is financially constrained. 
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Figure 4 



























Government Policy Failure with Different Costs of Capital and Innovative 
Capabilities 
In this section we acknowledge that government policy failure can also arise when 
subsidized firms differ vis-à-vis their financial constraints (i.e., marginal rates of cost) 
or innovative capabilities (marginal rates of return), but this information is partially or 
fully unknown to the government. As in Figures 1–2, we assume that firms are 
financially constrained, but on the contrary, both firms’ R&D activity results in equal 
social returns that are higher than mere private returns. 
In Figure 5, the government considers giving a grant subsidy to firms A and B. Both 
firms generate positive social returns and have an qual amount of internal funding, 
but they face different marginal costs for external funding: firm A’s marginal cost of 
external funding is high, firm B’s is low. If the government has perfect information, it 
will give a grant subsidy only to firm A: this choice will increase social benefits by 
ccaa ′′ , which is greater than the social costs (SC). On the contrary, subsidizing firm B 
would result in an increase in social costs (SC) vis-à-vis social benefits (quadrangle 
ccbb ′′ ). 
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Figure 5 





























Alternatively, let’s suppose that the government has imperfect information: it does not 
know which firm, A or B, is financially constrained. It looks at the average net gains 
from subsidies; given that they are higher than the av rage costs, it decides to 
subsidize both firms equally by splitting the grant i  equal parts (½ grant to both). 
However, the policy leads to government policy failure (GPF) as follows (Figure 2): 
( ) [ ] ccb½bcca½aSC)ccb½(bSC)cca½(aSCccaaGPF ′′−′′=−′′+−′′−−′′=  (3) 
where government policy failure relates to the difference between firms A and B in 
terms of the increase in social benefits generated by the subsidies. 
Even when it has imperfect information as described above, government might be 
able to reduce policy failure if it knows the firms’ pre-subsidy level of R&D. Such 
information is useful if it positively correlates with each firm’s optimal R&D 
investment in the current period, thus revealing which firm is likely to face greater 
financial constraints. In Figure 6, it is assumed for simplicity that pre-subsidy levels 
of R&D are equal to optimal investment in the current program period. In this case 
government can allocate subsidies based on the inverse grandfathering principle, in 
which firm i receives a proportion )/(1 *** BAii IIIK +−=  of the total grant available. 
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That is, the subsidy is in inverse proportion to firms’ pre-subsidy level of R&D.11 
Firm A, with a lower level of R&D, receives more sub idies ( 3/2=AK ), because it 
faces greater problems in finding external funding at a reasonable price. If the 
government strongly believes that pre-subsidy R&D reveals which firm is A and 
which is B, it could give the entire subsidy to the financially constrained firm A. 
However, if this belief is wrong the social benefits will be smaller than those 
produced by using the grandfathering principle. 
Figure 6 


































Figure 7 refers to a situation where the two firms differ in terms of innovative 
capabilities (i.e. marginal rates of return) but face equal financial constraints. If 
government is not aware of these differences and subsidies are delivered uniformly 
(same grant subsidy to both firms), a failure is very likely to arise. For example, in 
Figure 7, too large a grant subsidy is given to firm A: it would have chosen the same 
profit-maximizing R&D investment AI′  (point a′ ) even with a smaller subsidy. In 
addition, since firm B has higher innovative capabilities than firm A, a grant to firm B 
will increase social benefits at a higher rate (per its marginal rate of cost) than in the 
case of firm A. If a grant were given to two firms of type B, the increase in social 
benefits would be )ddbb(2 ′′ . However, if A and B are equally subsidized, the resulting 
government policy failure would be: 
                                               
11. Note that in reality the grant or tax credit is often directly proportional to the pre-grant level of 
R&D, which suggests possible inefficiencies in the allocation of subsidies.  
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Note that firm B’s (A’s) social benefits ddbb ′′  ( acac ′′ ) depend on the extent to which 
the subsidy generates increases in its investments and in social returns. 
Figure 7 
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The government could also try to connect subsidy size to firms’ pre-subsidy level of 
R&D when innovative capabilities differ. However, in this case government should 
give a larger, not smaller, proportion of the subsidy to the firm with stronger 
innovative capabilities (B) as revealed by larger R&D investments in the past (Figure 
7). If the grandfathering principle is followed, firm i would receive a 
proportion )/( *** BAii IIIK +=  of the total grant subsidy available. However, firm B, 
with a higher level of R&D, receives more subsidies because its innovation 
capabilities are (supposed to be) better. 
Policy Insights 
We have assumed that it is possible for government policy failure to derive only from 
informational constraints, and not from other problems characterizing bureaucracies 
(e.g., corruption and rent-seeking behavior of burea crats). Given this assumption, we 
have illustrated and analyzed the possibilities for active government policy failure 
when R&D subsidisable firms are heterogeneous, considering a variety of subsidy-
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allocation mechanisms. Firm heterogeneity may be unobservable by the government, 
and relates to: differing abilities of financially constrained (and unconstrained) firms 
(and their R&D projects) to generate social returns higher than mere private returns 
associated with R&D investments. In addition, our analysis has considered cases, 
where the severity of financing constraints differs across firms; or firms differ in 
terms of their innovative capabilities. 
Our analysis has shown that government policy failure arises when all (or part of) the 
available subsidy funds are granted to financially constrained firms that do not 
generate spillovers. However, firms’ ability to generate spillovers is a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition to merit the allocation f a subsidy to them. For example, if 
firms are financially unconstrained, there seems to be no rationale for R&D grants. 
The full amount of grant subsidy is wastefully spent regardless of the firms’ ability to 
generate spillovers. In this case, we have shown that a tax credit may be a more 
efficient allocation scheme. However, in a tax credit allocation scheme one must also 
ensure that social returns are high enough to offset the potentially higher social costs 
associated with tax credits (this cost is higher since it benefits all R&D investments 
and firms, irrespective of heterogeneity and exposure to sources of market failure). 
Firms may differ in terms of the severity of their financing constraints and/or their 
innovative capabilities. We have seen that government policy failure arises in a 
uniform-subsidy allocation when unobserved sources of heterogeneity exist. The 
failure is particularly likely if the available funds are granted to firms that i) suffer 
from relatively low financing constraints; or ii) have relatively low innovative 
capabilities. 
Grandfathering allocation schemes (based on the pre-subsidy level of R&D) can be 
used in an attempt to minimize the government policy failure. We have shown that 
when the innovative capabilities of firms differ, direct grandfathering is 
recommended. However, when the marginal costs differ inverse grandfathering 
should be used instead. Thus, government policy failure arises in the grandfathering 
allocation scheme when: i) higher subsidies are incorre tly granted to firms with 
fewer financial constraints; ii) higher subsidies are incorrectly granted to firms with 
lower innovative capabilities. 
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Overall, it is not clear that either of these allocation mechanisms considered is clearly 
preferable in terms of minimizing government policy failure. With respect to R&D 
policy interventions and instruments, this finding challenges policymakers to carefully 
consider available options as they strive to support R&D investments by firms. We 
have dealt with policy initiatives in this paper, which seek to reduce the cost of R&D 
to the firm (Folster 1991; Stoneman 1991) and increase the pay-off of firm-level 
innovation. It is less easy to see how our static analysis can apply to policies designed 
to enhance the innovation potential of firms, such as collaborative R&D programs 
(Peck 1986; Baumol 1992; Geroski 1992); or to policies that link firms’ internal 
efforts with public R&D carried out in the science base. The latter merits further 
investigation. What our analysis has the potential to chieve, however, is to encourage 
policymaking and academic communities to consider the range of R&D policy 
choices to be made by government. It also highlights t e need to explore new ways to 
ameliorate information asymmetries between firms and government with respect to 
R&D investment decisions. Finally, our analysis highli hts some of the true 
complexities in the R&D policy allocation process.  
Conclusion 
Using a range of theoretical illustrations, we studied the notion of government policy 
failure in R&D policy in terms of allocation mechanisms for R&D funding at the 
micro (firm) level. This topic has been largely overlooked in the literature on 
government intervention with respect to R&D policy. This is an opportune time to 
examine this concept, in view of increased interest (among policymakers and 
academics alike) in the potential of R&D policy support to help economies not only to 
grow, but also to overcome economic ills resulting from the global financial crisis. It 
is particularly vital to limit government failure associated with R&D policy 
interventions in the current economic downturn; government budgets are more 
constrained than ever, so funding must be allocated s optimally as possible.  
One of the key contributions of the current paper is its potential to stimulate further 
debate; such debate needs to happen from the perspective of both theory and policy. 
The paper highlights the benefits of reverting to theoretical underpinnings of 
microeconomic concepts like government failure, which are frequently bandied about 
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but seldom understood in a policy context. The discus ion here is merely the first step 
in this type of analysis. 
Relationships between firms and government frequently last over many years and 
involve numerous support packages; therefore, modeling longer-term relationships 
(possibly within a general equilibrium analysis model which includes a 
macrodynamic perspective) should be of interest to fu ure research in this field. A 
more general equilibrium framework would facilitate exploration of issues such as 
those surrounding provision of R&D subsidies to firms in a dynamic setting; there is a 
whole other story to be explored beyond the partial equilibrium framework presented 
in the current paper. Much more work still has to be undertaken in order to understand 
the potential positive and negative effects (and externalities) of R&D policy 
interventions and instruments in a broader general equilibrium setting.  
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Both the tax credit and grant subsidy can be used a allocation mechanisms when 
firms are financially constrained. Hence, it is usef l to compare their social costs 
when both allocation schemes generate same amount of additional social benefits. For 
example, the social costs of the proportional subsidy (tax credit) would have been 
much higher than those of a grant subsidy in Figure 1: the rectangle )ab(IA ′′′  is larger 
in both height and width than the grey area BC. Figure A1 illustrates a case where tax 
credit is cheaper for the government. Notice, however, that the use of subsidies is 
questionable in both cases given that the social costs are larger than the social benefits 
(Figure A1). The amount of money spent on the tax credit can easily get high if firms’ 
expenditure on R&D is large, and vice versa. Tax credit can be useful if the firm can 
get funding from capital markets at a reasonable price (i.e. MPC curve is relatively 
flat). 
Figure A1 
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